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BOOK REVIEW
IMPEACHMENT:

By Raoul Berger.'
Harvard University Press. 1973. Pp. xii, 345.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

Cambridge, Mass.:
$14.95.

PROBLEMS.

Reviewed by NathanielL. Nathanson2
Rarely has a serious study in constitutional law and history
achieved the popular success that has apparently been accorded Raoul
Berger's latest contribution to legal literature. It has not yet appeared
in the New York Times best-seller list, but the demand for it in law
libraries and the extent to which it has been quoted in the press
must have reached phenomenal proportions. Lest there be the slightest
suspicion that this phenomenon has been anything more than a
happy coincidence, suffice it to say that this study was obviously
conceived long before Watergate became a household word, and that
it couldn't have happened to a more deserving work.
If there was a current event that prompted this searching study
of the origins and current problems of impeachment, it was probably
Gerald Ford's legal justification, presented to the House of Representatives, for the proposed impeachment of Justice Douglas:
What, then, is an impeachable offense?
The only honest answer is that an impeachable offense is
whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers
[it] to be at a given moment in history; conviction results from
whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office. Again, the historical context and political
climate are important; there are few fixed principles among
the handful of precedents.3
Presumably, Congressman, now Vice-President, Ford did not fully
appreciate that he could not have chosen words better calculated to
provoke Raoul Berger into exploring the mustiest corners of the Harvard Law Library to prove him wrong. Yet, as Berger himself recognizes, Mr. Ford was not the first to give voice to such sentiments; indeed, he even had the support of such respectable authority as Thomas
Cooley, who characterized impeachable offenses as " 'any such as in
1. Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University
Law School.
2. Frederic P. Vose Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
3. 116 CONG. Ri c. 11913 (1970).
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the opinion of the House are deserving of punishment under that
process' " (p.53 n.1). Furthermore, in one of its aspects, the result of
Berger's research is to lend some support to the Cooley-Ford thesis.
Expanding on what Mr. Ford meant by the handful of American
precedents to include all of the available English precedents that might
reasonably be considered to give content to "high crimes and misdemeanors," Berger establishes quite conclusively that the term must
have been used in a sense quite different from that of the ordinary
felonies or misdemeanors indictable under common law or statute.
Indeed, the use of the term "misdemeanors" for the purpose of stating
an impeachable offense first appeared before the concept of a misdemeanor as a minor crime had been developed. The difference between misdemeanor as an impeachable offense and misdemeanor as
a petty crime is further accentuated by the occasional use in the
English precedents of the term "high misdemeanors" without interposition of the word "crimes." Consequently, Berger reads the adjective "high" as applying to both crimes and misdemeanors, thus freeing
the latter, and probably the former, from the straitjacket of indictable
offenses.
This freedom is not, in Berger's view, to be equated with the
conclusion that the key phrase either was intended or can now properly be interpreted as a blank check into which any content may
be inserted, guided only by the political considerations of the moment. Rather it was a phrase deliberately chosen as a more confining substitute than the term first suggested, "maladministration."
Presumably, as Berger suggests, the Framers must have been familiar
with the use of the phrase in English impeachment practice and must
have assumed that history would at least help to define its content. In
pursuing that content, Berger suggests that the total number of discrete precedents are "reducible to intelligible categories." These include "misapplication of funds," "abuse of official power," "neglect
of duty," "encroachment on or contempt of Parliament's prerogatives,"
"corruption," "betrayal of trust" and "giving pernicious advice to
the Crown" (pp. 70-71). It might fairly be said that only the last
of these categories might include instances of poor judgment or disagreements on policy within its ambit. But Berger draws back from
such an implication by characterizing it as "extravagant" and explaining that it "derived in part from the postulated inviolability of the
King, which compelled attribution of his misdeeds to his ministers,"
and that "it became a weapon in the struggle to make ministers accountable to the Parliament rather than the King, to punish them
for espousing policies disliked by the Parliament" (p. 71). Another
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example drawn entirely from history, of the difficulties that might
be caused by emphasizing a "technical meaning" for high crimes
and misdemeanors, is the treatment of the rendering of unconstitutional opinions by judges as impeachable conduct in at least one of the
English precedents (p. 90). Here again Berger rejects the category
as inapposite to the American framework, in which it is the appropriate
business of judges to pass on questions of constitutionality.
Such a selective use of the lessons of history is entirely admirable
from the standpoint of achieving a satisfactory content for the term
"high crimes and misdemeanors" in the framework of our constitutional system. But it is at least partially inconsistent with the view, also
espoused by Berger, that the Framers considered that the phrase had
a "limited," "technical meaning" (p. 87). 4 This inconsistency suggests
another question raised by Berger-namely whether "high crimes
and misdemeanors" means the same thing for all types of offices-the
Presidency, judgeships, high or low, and all other civil offices. Rather
surprisingly for one who places such great emphasis on the "technical
meaning" of the term "high crimes and misdemeanors," Berger now
leans toward the view that it does not mean the same thing for all
officers, although he previously espoused the view that the key words
could be given only one meaning. Engagingly he tells us that "further study has led me to alter my view" (p. 91). Apparently this
switch is induced more by practical than historical considerationssuch as the "shock waves that can rock the very foundations of government" (p. 91); the "frustrations that may accumulate when succession
to a President . . . falls to one whom the electorate did not really

contemplate in the presidency" (p. 92) and, finally, the fact that "if
the President brings disgrace upon his office by a lesser offense, for
example, by openly associating with notorious corruptionists, the
people can remove him at the polls" (p. 92). Berger concludes that
it is difficult on removal of judges to attribute to the Founders
an intention to curtail the common law scope of "high crimes
and misdemeanors" (which they employed with consciousness
of their "technical" meaning) merely because they had good
4. The particular reference to the "limited" and "technical" meaning of the
phrase in the Constitutional Convention was not in discussion of impeachment, but
rather in the course of rejecting "high misdemeanor" as one of the appropriate
grounds for returning a fugitive from justice to the state from which he had fled: "In
the Convention 'the words "high misdemeanor" were struck out, and "other crime" inserted, in order to comprehend all proper cases; it being doubtful whether "high misR. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT:
demeanor" had not a technical meaning too limited .......
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 74 (1973), quoting from M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1911).
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reason, not present in the case of judges, to stress that removal
of the President required "great offenses." [P. 92.]
What then, we must ask, does Berger offer as the true or appropriate, if not "technical," meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors"?
To Ford's rather crass assumption that an "impeachable offense is
whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to
be at a given moment of history," Berger opposes the view:
If "high crimes and misdemeanors" had an ascertainable content at the time the Constitution was adopted, that content
furnishes the boundaries of the power. It is no more open to
Congress to stray beyond those boundaries than it is to include
in the companion word "bribery" an offense such as "robbery,"
which had a quite different common law connotation. The design of the Framers to confer a limited power is confirmed
by their rejection of removal by Address which knew no limits.
[Pp. 87-88.]
Yet Berger reserves the right to reject some of the English precedents
for the meaning of the phrase as inapposite to our own constitutional
system, and even to vary the meaning, depending on the nature of
the office involved. It is difficult for me to accept the conclusions that
the English precedents serve as a kind of one-way street, that they establish the outermost limits of the phrase but do not necessarily permit us to reach all of those limits, and that the applicable limits vary
with the offices. Rather I incline to the view that the English precedents shed only as much light either way, as a limiting or liberating
force, as makes good sense under our system of government. Insofar
as the phrase had a technical meaning for the Founders it must have
meant the offenses that had been regarded as appropriate grounds
for impeachment. But since they probably did not know as much
about the English precedents as Berger and others have now taught
us, it is at least questionable that the intention was either to embrace
them all, or to limit the application of the phrase exactly to those
categories that later scholarship might discover. Without doubt they
chose the phrase conscious that it came to them freighted with
historical significance; presumably they intended that the lessons of
that history should not be ignored. To that extent, at least, Mr. Berger
is surely right and Mr. Ford was wrong. Mr. Ford was also wrong if
he was suggesting that the House in impeaching, or the Senate in convicting, could properly ignore the long-term significance of their actions, oblivious to the fact that they too would be making history and
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creating constitutional precedent, and that this too might be a consideration far outweighing the political pressures for, or immediate
advantages of, a change in the Presidency or any other office.
Incident to Berger's inquiry into the proper substantive meaning
of the impeachment clause is the more procedural but equally important question of who is the final arbiter on the subject-the House
and the Senate or the United States Supreme Court. Those familiar
with Berger's general views concerning the institution of judicial review, as elaborated in his previous scholarship in the general field of
administrative law and his other outstanding contribution to constitutional history, Congress v. The Supreme Court, will not be entirely
surprised by his conclusion that the last word properly belongs to the
Supreme Court. In arriving at this conclusion, Berger recognizes that
he has some pretty formidable authorities to overcome, including
6
Justice Story 5 and Professor Herbert Wechsler. Nevertheless, he finds
considerable comfort in the fact that Wechsler did not anticipate the
holding in Powell v. McCormack7 when he analogized the final authority of the Senate with respect to impeachment to the final authority of the House or Senate with respect to the seating or expulsion
of members. In short, Berger concludes that the decision in Powell
"calls for reconsideration of the scope of the Senate's 'sole' right to
try impeachments" (p. 104).
Such reconsideration suggests, in the first place, an analogy between
the three qualifications for membership in the House under article
I, section 2-age, residence and citizenship (the only grounds upon
which exclusion is permitted by the decision in Powell), and the three
grounds to which impeachment is confined by article II, section 4-treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. If the Court may
find a reviewable excess or abuse of power in a congressional exclusion
that does not rest on one of the grounds of disqualification, why may
it not also find a similar excess or abuse of power in an impeachment
which is based on an obvious distortion of one of the three specified
grounds? The weak link in this particular Berger argument is that
the exclusion of Congressman Powell was admittedly not based on any
of the three qualifications. Consequently, the question actually decided by the Court was whether exclusion was indeed limited to the
three grounds of disqualification. A similar judicial review of an impeachment avowedly outside any of the three permissible categories
5. 2 J. STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 805
(5th ed. 1905).
6. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HA.v. L. REv.

1, 8 (1959).
7.

395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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would be comparable and equally well-justified, as a review based on
abuse of power. But the more likely and difficult case-with which
Berger seems to be more realistically concerned-is an impeachment
which purports to rest upon one of the three grounds, but in so doing
gives such grounds a distorted and unjustifiable meaning., It is true,
as Berger argues, that the "political question" doctrine does not itself
provide an insuperable obstacle, especially as interpreted in the recent
cases of Powell v. McCormack9 and Baker v. Carr.10 The terms themselves-treason, bribery, high crimes and misdemeanors-are not obviously unfit for judicial determination; on the contrary, they are
ostensibly the kind of language upon which judicial interpretation is
most apt to thrive. As Berger demonstrates, neither is the conflict between the executive and the legislature inherently the type of controversy into which the Court should not enter.
Nevertheless, a strong case can be made for the proposition that
the substance of the question-the exact meaning of the three grounds
-has been entrusted by the Constitution to the joint judgment of the
House and the Senate. This conclusion rests partly upon the constitutional evolution of the impeachment clause itself, embodying as it does
a deliberate choice between the courts and the legislature as the instruments of impeachment, and partly upon what are conceived to be the
realities of the process and its place in our constitutional system. The
exact method of impeachment reflects a careful meld of the legislative
and judicial processes, as is evidenced by the language giving the Senate "sole power to try impeachments" and the choice of the Chief
Justice to preside in the trial of the President. To assume that a
President, who, despite the great power and influence of his office,
had so lost the confidence of the Republic that he could not survive
the impeachment process, could be reinstated by a judgment of the
Supreme Court, seems incompatible with political realities. To suggest
that he might recover a money judgment in the Court of Claims for
unjustified ouster would add a touch of mockery to the whole proceeding, irrespective of the likelihood of Congress appropriating funds
to pay the judgment. Even though, as Berger suggests, impeachments
are much more likely to occur with respect to other officials-particularly judges-the general theory of judicial review must be tested by its
application to the hardest case.
8. The example that Berger uses is an impeachment avowedly based upon a charge
of "treason" but actually based on the ground that the President "attempted to subvert the Constitution." R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 106.
9. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
10. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Another significant question to which Berger addresses himself,
and to the solution of which he brings all the resources of his prodigious scholarship, is whether the impeachment process is constitutionally the exclusive method of removing article III judges. Berger's
answer to the question is categorically in the negative. His reasons
are a blend of analytical, historical and practical considerations.
Analytically, he asserts that misbehavior, the opposite of "good behavior," is not coterminous with the grounds of impeachment, namely
"treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors." Even
if high crimes and misdemeanors are not restricted in the case of
judges to "great offenses" suitable for presidential impeachment, as
Berger himself believes, there are still types of conduct incompatible
with "good behavior" as a judge that might not constitute grounds
for impeachment. The most obvious examples would be irresponsible
conduct resulting from senility, mental illness or frequent involvement
in petty offenses incompatible with judicial dignity. Consequently,
Berger concludes, it is difficult to believe that the Founders intended
impeachment to be the sole method of removing federal judges. In
Berger's view, this conclusion is historically supported by the English
precedents antedating the Convention, by the colonial practice, by the
constitutional debates and by the action of the first Congress. According to the English practice, scire facias was the accepted common law
writ for forfeiture of any office held during good behavior (including
judicial office), when the charge was misbehavior. This writ survived
the development of impeachment and address (removal by the king
upon the suggestion of Parliament) as alternative methods of removal.
Further, scire facias was known to the Founders because it was reflected
to some extent in the colonial and pre-constitutional state practices.
The debates in the constitutional convention are at best enigmatic
on the exact point. The only explicit consideration of another method
for removal of judges was the rejection of the suggestion that it be by
"Address"-a method established in several states in the form of removal by the governor upon the recommendation of one or both
houses of the legislature. The objections presented to this method of
removal were that it would result in "weakening too much the independence of the Judges"; that it would be "fundamentally wrong"
and "arbitrary" because it constituted "removal without a trial"; and
that it would be inappropriate because "the Supreme Court is to
judge between the United States and particular States" (p. 152-53).
These objections, Berger argues, run only against removal by Congress
or the Executive, not against a judicial removal analogous to scire
facias.
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Finally, Berger recognizes that there were some peripheral remarks contrary to this view in the first Congress during the debate
on presidential removal powers. He finds these over-balanced by the
action of the same Congress in providing "that upon a conviction
in court for bribery a judge shall be 'forever disqualified to hold any
offices' " (p. 150). Since this would be inconsistent with regarding
impeachment as the exclusive method of creating disqualification
from judicial office, Berger regards it as equally inconsistent with
regarding impeachment as the exclusive method of removal from
judicial office.
The historical arguments on the other side of the constitutional
question (favoring impeachment as the sole remedy) have been developed primarily by Martha Andes Ziskind 1 1 and Philip Kurland. 12
Ziskind thinks that the early English precedents, especially those dealing with scire facias as a method of removing judges, are of little, if
any, significance in determining the intention or understanding of
the Framers. She believes that scire facias, for this purpose, was replaced by removal upon Address of both Houses of Parliament as
provided for in the Act of Settlement in 1701.13 She also notes that
"Blackstone, the principal source of English law for eighteenth century Americans, did not mention judicial removal by scire facias,"
and that "no colonial or state constitution provided for such a use
for the scire facias, nor was a proposal made to include it during the
Constitutional Convention." 1 4 Berger suggests in response that failure
of the state constitutions to mention scire facias is immaterial because
"it is not the function of a Constitution to detail relevant writs" (p.
145). He attaches more importance to the fact that both the Delaware
and Maryland constitutions provided for court removal upon conviction of misbehavior, thus precluding the inference that there was total
ignorance of judicial forfeiture.
To my mind, the historical background is far from conclusive
either way. Nevertheless, the care with which the state constitutions
provided for removal of judges, either by impeachment, address, judicial forfeiture or some combination of these, plus the absence of any
reference to the common law method of removal in any of the conven11. Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American
Precedents, in 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 135.
12. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes
from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1969). But see Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision and Removal-Some Possibilities under the Constitution, 28
MICH. L. REv. 870 (1930), taking the same position as Berger,
13. 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (1700).
14. Ziskind, supra note 11, at 138.
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tion debates, or contemporaneous literature, suggests that the Framers
probably were not relying upon any common law solution for the
problem, even if they were aware of it. Such a reading of the constitutional history does not preclude an implied power in Congress, arising
from the good behavior clause and the necessary and proper clause,
to provide for removal of judges by means other than impeachment.
As Berger suggests, the means would have to be consistent with the
independence of the judiciary. Even so, I share Kurland's concern5
that the particular remedy chosen might be worse than the disease.1
The exact form that Congress might provide cannot be foretold with
any confidence; numerous possibilities may be imagined. Berger sug15. Kurland, supra note 12, at 666. Berger himself suggests that if the impeachment clause were to be deemed exclusive, "it is reasonable to assume that the
exigencies of government which led proponents of removal to stress that removal of
incapacitated officers was imperative would have prevailed on them to overlook the
verbal difficulties of stretching 'high crimes and misdemeanors' to include insanity and
incapacity." R. BatR, supra note 4, at 186. The stretch is not so great if the emphasis
is placed upon the conduct involved, i.e., the attempt to perform judicial duties
when one is obviously incapable of performing them properly. Furthermore, if one
adopts the view of Mr. Justice Harlan, in Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 89
(1970) (concurring in denial of writ), that the Judicial Council may take into account
a judge's ability to dispose of his docket in the assignment of cases, id. at 121, then the
necessity for the more drastic step of total disqualification may frequently be avoided.
Finally, the possibility of the Senate's delegating to some of its members the timeconsuming job of hearing the evidence in impeachment proceedings should not be
summarily rejected as unconstitutional, even though Berger seems inclined in that direction. R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 172-73. The Rules of the Senate, 92d Congress, provide:
XI. That in the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the Senate, upon the order of the Senate, shall appoint a committee of twelve Senators
to receive evidence and take testimony at such times and places as the committee
may determine, and for such purpose the committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall (unless otherwise ordered by
the Senate) exercise all the powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and
the Presiding Officer of the Senate, respectively, under the rules of procedure and
practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of procedure and practice in
the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials shall govern the procedure and
practice of the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings
and testimony had and given before such committee, and such report shall be
received by the Senate and the evidence so received and the testimony so taken
shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to the right of the Senate
to determine competency, relevancy, and materiality, as having been received
and taken before the Senate, but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate from
sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open Senate, or by order
of the Senate having the entire trial in open Senate.
S. Doc. No. 92-1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 137-38 (1971). This is considerably different from
the proposal advanced by Preble Stolz, and vigorously attacked by Berger, for the use
of masters who would make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Stolz,
Disciplining Federal Judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless? 57 CALIF. L. REv. 659 (1969).
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gests a special court, comparable to the Emergency Court of Appeals,
consisting of district and circuit judges, with perhaps one Supreme
Court Justice, that would "hear and determine charges of misbehavior
filed by the investigatory-accusatory branch of the Judiciary Department; and upon a finding of 'misbehavior' a judgment would issue removing the offending judge, a forfeiture of the office" (p. 175). Irrespective of the merits of the proposal, or the intentions of the Framers
concerning the removal of judges, this proposal seems a significant
enough departure from the actual practice of our constitutional system
to warrant a constitutional amendment. Having waited this long to
make any change in this particular aspect of government, can we not
wait a little longer for the amendment process to take effect? With the
possible exception of the equal rights amendment, that process has
not proven inadequate in recent years, where the need has been considered great enough. The best illustration is the twenty-fifth amendment dealing with the similar problem of the incapacity of the President. Of course, the case of any one federal judge is not comparable
to that of the presidency, but the general question of how federal
judges appointed pursuant to article III are to be removed is surely
one of constitutional dimension. Furthermore, its solution might well
be linked with a mandatory age for retirement of all federal judges,
a change that might considerably simplify the problems of removal.
I trust that this and other points of disagreement, or qualified
agreement, with some of Berger's views will be taken as tributes to,
rather than as disparagements of, the value of his contributions. The
points of disagreement are based more on Berger's scholarship than on
my own, and have been principally stimulated by his meticulous
separation of primary findings from ultimate conclusions. This reviewer has deliberately concentrated on the areas of disagreement, rather
than upon the areas of complete accord, including, for example, the
splendid vignettes of the Chase and Johnson impeachment proceedings. Berger presents each of these as an object lesson in how impeachments should not be handled-the Chase impeachment because the
Justice should not have been acquitted; the Johnson case because the
proceedings should not have been conducted in the first place.18 I can
only commend these chapters to the reader's attention, along with the
rest of the book, as the finest background available, not only for the
problems of the immediate present, but also for possible encounters
with similar problems in the years to come.

16. For a sympathetic view of the Johnson impeachment proceeding, see M.
DDic, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON (1973).
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